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Abstract
In this paper we study exact TU games having ￿nite dimensional
non-atomic cores, a class of games that includes relevant economic
games. We ￿rst characterize them by showing that they are a par-
ticular type of market games. Using this characterization, we then
show that in such a class the cores are their unique von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable sets.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we study transferable utility (TU) games whose cores are ￿nite
dimensional subsets of na(Σ),t h es p a c eo fa l l￿nitely additive non-atomic
charges. This is an important class of games, which contains many relevant
economic games, such as production games and games arising from exchange
economies (see, e.g., Hart and Neyman, 1988, p. 32).
In an earlier paper, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2001), inter alia we
provided simple conditions under which a game belongs to such a class and
we argued that they are going to be satis￿ed in many cases of interest. In
this paper we move on in this research line and we focus on exact games
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1having ￿nite dimensional cores in na(Σ). For this important class of games,
which we denote by ef (Σ),w ep r o v et w om a i nr e s u l t s :
￿ In Theorem 2 we characterize the class ef (Σ) by showing that a game
belongs to ef (Σ) if and only if it is a generalized linear production
game, a particular type of measure game whose associated function g
has the very simple form g(x)=m i n t∈T a(t)•x,w h e r eT is a compact
metric space and a : T → RN is a continuous map.
￿ Using the above characterization, in Theorem 3 we show that the cores
of the games in ef (Σ) are their unique von Neumann-Morgenstern
stable sets.
The interest of the ￿rst result lies in the simplicity of the characterization,
as generalized linear production games have a very simple structure. More-
over, Proposition 1 will show that generalized production games are market
games, and so it turns out that all elements of ef (Σ) are indeed a special type
of market games. Under a suitable continuity condition the converse holds
as well, that is, suitably continuous market games are actually generalized
linear production games. This is proved in Proposition 7.
The second result establishes a remarkable property of games in ef (Σ):
for them two fundamental solution concepts, cores and stable sets, are equiv-
alent. As well-known, stable sets are in general not easy to handle, as there
are typically many of them and they are not easy to ￿nd. This has greatly
limited the use of stable sets, despite their conceptual appeal (see, e.g., Au-
mann, 1987, and Lucas, 1992). In contrast, the core is a much simpler set
and it has gained a central importance in all applications. When the two so-
lution concepts coincide we have an ideal situation, in which the conceptual
appeal of stable sets and the simplicity of cores are combined.
Cases in which this ￿ideal￿ situation occurs have been discovered in some
insightful papers. In particular, Shapley (1971) showed that stable sets and
cores coincide for ￿nite positive convex games, a result recently extended
to in￿nite positive convex games by Einy and Shitovitz (1996) and Einy,
Holzman, Monderer, and Shitovitz (1997). However, Proposition 5 will show
that there is only a trivial overlap between the class of convex games and the
class ef (Σ).
On the other hand, Einy, Holzman, Monderer, and Shitovitz (1996) have
shown that cores and stable sets coincide also for exact and positive glove
2market games, a special class of elements of ef (Σ) characterized by having
cores that are polytopes in na+ (Σ) (see Proposition 4 below). As anticipated,
in this paper we show in Theorem 3 that this equivalence result holds for all
elements of the much larger class ef (Σ); this also sheds further light on the
cores of these games by showing that they feature a noteworthy property of
external stability besides the usual internal one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminary
material, while Section 3 introduces closure under minorization, a notion
that may be of independent interest. Sections 4 and 5, which are the heart
of the paper, contain the characterization and the result on stability we just
discussed. In Appendix A we collect some useful properties of m-closure,
while Appendix B contains all proofs.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
2.1 Games and Cores
Throughout the paper, Ω is the set of players and Σ is the σ-algebra of
admissible coalitions. Subsets of Ω a r eu n d e r s t o o dt ob ei nΣ even where not
stated explicitly.
A set function ν : Σ → R is a game if ν (∅)=0 . A game ν is
positive if ν (E) ≥ 0 for all E,
bounded if supE∈Σ|ν (E)| < ∞.
superadditive if ν (E)+ν (E0) ≤ ν (E ∪ E0) for all coalitions E and E0 such
that E ∩ E0 = ∅,
convex (or supermodular) if ν (E ∪ E0)+ν (E ∩ E0) ≥ ν (E)+ν (E0) for all
coalitions E and E0,
additive (or a charge) if ν (E ∪ E0)=ν (E)+ν (E0) for all pairwise disjoint
coalitions E and E0,




i=1 ν (Ei) for all count-
able collections of pairwise disjoint coalitions {Ei}
∞
i=1,
continuous at A ∈ Σ if ν (An) → ν (A) for all the sequences An ↑ A and
An ↓ A,
3continuous if ν is continuous at any coalition A ∈ Σ.
Unless otherwise stated, charges and measures are understood to be
signed. The set of all charges (measures) that are bounded with respect
to the variation norm is denoted by ba(Σ) (ca(Σ)). Generic elements of
ba(Σ) are denoted by m or ￿, while its nonnegative elements are denoted by
P or Q.
Ac h a r g em is non-atomic (or strongly continuous) if, for every ε > 0,
there exists a ￿nite partition {E1,...,En} of Ω in Σ such that |m|(Ei) ≤ ε
for all i = 1,..,n.W h e n m is countable additive, it is non-atomic if and
only if for all m(E) 6=0there exists B ⊆ E such that m(B) 6=0and
m(E − B) 6=0 . The set of all non-atomic charges is denoted by na(Σ),
while naσ (Σ)=na(Σ)∩ca(Σ).W er e c a l lt h a tna(Σ) is a Banach sublattice
of ba(Σ).
The importance of non-atomic charges is due to their range convex-
ity. Speci￿cally, let m =( m1,...,mN):Σ → RN be a vector charge. If
each mi is non-atomic, then by the Lyapunov Theorem the range R(m)=
{m(A):A ∈ Σ} is a convex subset of RN (see Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara
Rao, 1983).
The game ν : Σ → R is a measure game if there exists {P1,...,PN} ⊆
na+ (Σ) and a function g : R(P) → R such that
ν (E)=g (P (E)) for all E ∈ Σ.
The core of a game ν is
core(ν)={m ∈ ba(Σ):m(Ω)=ν (Ω) and m(E) ≥ ν(E) for all E ∈ Σ}.
T h ec o r eo fag a m ei saw e a k ∗-compact subset of ba(Σ).
A game with non-empty core is called balanced. Given a game ν : Σ → R,
its restriction νE : ΣE → R on a coalition E is called a subgame. A game
whose all subgames νE have non-empty cores is called totally balanced.
The exact envelope νe of a balanced game ν is de￿ned by νe(E)=
minm∈core(ν) m(E) for all E ∈ Σ. A balanced game ν is exact if ν = νe.
Bounded convex games are an important class of exact games (see Marinacci
and Montrucchio, 2001).
Given a subset Γ ⊆ ba(Σ), co(Γ) denotes its convex hull, cow∗
(Γ) its
weak∗-closed convex hull, and cos (Γ) its norm-closed convex hull.
4The space of all bounded Σ-measurable function on Ω,e q u i p p e dw i t h
the sup norm topology, is denoted by B (Σ). The standard duality pairing
between f ∈ B (Σ) and m ∈ ba(Σ) will be written as hf,mi =
R
fdm.
Finally, B1 (Σ) denotes the elements f in B (Σ) such that 0 ≤ f ≤ 1.
2.2 Market Games
Market games will play an important role in this paper; it is a classic class
of games that for example arises in modeling monetary exchange economies
(see, e.g., Hart, 1977).
Their de￿n i t i o ni sb a s e do nt h ena-topology of B (Σ), whose neighborhood
base at f ∈ B (Σ) is given by the sets Uf (ε;m1,...,mN) of the form:
{g ∈ B (Σ):|hg,mii − hf,mii| < ε for each i = 1,...,N}
where {m1,...,mN} ⊆ na(Σ) and ε > 0. Under this topology B (Σ) is a
locally convex (not Hausdorﬀ) topological vector space. The na-topology
is the coarsest topology which makes continuous all the linear functionals
f 7→ hf,mi with m ∈ na(Σ). This topology was introduced by Aumann and
Shapley (1974), though the version we use here is ￿ner than theirs, as here
we allow any measure in na(Σ) rather than just those in naσ (Σ).W i t ht h e
exception of Proposition 6, we will always restrict the na-topology to B1 (Σ);
that is, B1 (Σ) will be endowed with the relative na-topology.
By the Lyapunov Theorem the characteristic functions are na-dense in
B1 (Σ). Therefore, any game ν : Σ → R, when viewed as a function over
the characteristic functions 1E, has at most one na-continuous extension to
B1 (Σ). Following Aumann and Shapley (1974), we denote this extension by
ν∗.
We can now introduce market games. A game ν : Σ → R is said to be a
market game if it is superadditive and if it admits a positively homogeneous
and na-continuous extension ν∗ to B1 (Σ).
This de￿nition of market games is more general than the usual one since
we are considering the na-topology rather than the coarser naσ-topology.
Nevertheless, it can be checked that market games as de￿ned here still en-
joy important properties. In particular, they are totally balanced and their
extension ν∗ is concave. For the latter property, notice that, by Mertens
(1990), the classic extension of Lyapunov Theorem due to Dvoretzky, Wald,
and Wolfowitz (1951) holds in na(Σ) as well, and so we can still use the
5argument of Proposition 27.1 of Aumann and Shapley (1974) to show that
ν∗ is concave.
3 Closure under Minorization
T op r o v eo u rc h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n sw eh a v et oi n t r o d u c et h en o t i o no fc l o s u r e
under minorization, which may be of independent interest. Throughout the
p a p e rw ed e n o t eb yΓα,w i t hα ∈ R,a( p o s s i b l y￿n i t e )s u b s e to fba(Σ) such
that m(Ω)=α for each m ∈ Γα.W ew i l ld r o pt h es u b s c r i p tα whenever no
confusion arises.
De￿nition 1 The closure under minorization (m-closure, for short) Γα of
as e tΓα is de￿ned as follows: m ∈ Γα if m(Ω)=α and for each E ∈ Σ
there is some m0 ∈ Γα such that m(E) ≥ m0 (E).T h es e tΓα is m-closed if
Γα = Γα.
When Γα is weak∗-compact, the previous de￿nition can be equivalently
formulated by using the lower envelope set function
νΓα (E)=m i n
m∈Γα
m(E) for all E ∈ Σ,
which is naturally associated with Γα. It is immediate to check that m ∈ Γα
if and only if m ≥ νΓα and m(Ω)=νΓα (Ω)=α.
The correspondence Γα 7−→ Γα is a closure operation on the set baα (Σ)=
{m ∈ ba(Σ):m(Ω)=α},t h a ti s ,i ts a t i s ￿es the following properties:
(i) Γα ⊆ Γα,
(ii) Γα ⊆ Γ0
α whenever Γα ⊆ Γ0
α,
(iii) Γα = Γα.
The m-closure has some further useful properties, collected in Appendix
A.
In order to state our ￿rst signi￿cant result, Theorem 1, we have to intro-
duce an important map. Given a vector charge m =( m1,...,mN):Σ → RN,
let π : RN → span(R(m)) be the orthogonal projection on the linear span
span(R(m)).D e ￿ne the map R : span{m1,...,m N} → span(R(m)) by
R(χ • m)=π (χ) for all χ ∈ R
N. (1)
6The next lemma shows that R is a well-de￿ned ￿canonical￿ isomorphism
between the two key vector spaces span{m1,...,mN} and span(R(m)).
Lemma 1 The map R : span{m1,...,mN} → span(R(m)) is a linear and
weak∗-continuous isomorphism. In particular, ￿ = R(￿) • m holds for all
￿ ∈ span{m1,...,mN}.
A ￿rst application of this canonical isomorphism is given by the next
result, which provides an important property of the m-closure in the ￿nite
dimensional setting.
Theorem 1 If Γα is a ￿nite dimensional subset of na(Σ),t h e nΓα = co(Γα).
In other words, a set Γα is m-closed if and only if it is convex, provided
Γα ⊆ na(Σ) is ￿nite-dimensional. In order to put in sharper focus this
result, in Appendix A we present few examples that show that the equality
Γα = co(Γα) is in general false, even for ￿nite games.
Theorem 1 delivers the following sum and diﬀerence rule for exact games
(the symbol “ denotes the Minkowski diﬀerence, de￿ned below in Appendix
A).
Corollary 1 Let ν1,ν2 : Σ → R be any two exact games. Then
core(ν1 + ν2)=core(ν1)+core(ν2), (2)
and
core(ν1 − ν2)=core(ν1) “ core(ν2). (3)
If, in addition, core(ν1) and core(ν2) are both ￿nite dimensional subsets of
na(Σ),t h e n
core(ν1 + ν2)=core(ν1)+core(ν2). (4)
Property (3) and (4) have been proved for ￿nite and positive convex games
by Danilov and Koshevoy (2000), while Marinacci and Montrucchio (2001)
proved (4) for general bounded convex games. However, by Proposition 5
below there is only a trivial overlap between the class of convex games and
the class of games having ￿nite dimensional cores in na(Σ).A s a r e s u l t ,
the derivation of property (4) for these two classes of games is altogether
independent.
74 The Characterization
Eq. (4) shows that exact games having ￿nite dimensional cores in na(Σ)
form a convex cone. Let us denote this cone by ef (Σ). Using the properties
of the m-closure, in this section we provide a general characterization of the
cone ef (Σ).I no r d e rt od ot h i s ,w e￿rst have to present a class of measure
games introduced by Marinacci and Montrucchio (2001).
Let a : T → RN be a continuous map de￿n e do nac o m p a c tm e t r i cs p a c e
T, and de￿ne the function g : RN → R by
g (x)=m i n
t∈T
a(t) • x for all x ∈ R
N. (5)
We call the measure game ν = g (P):Σ → R a generalized linear production
game.W h e nT is a ￿nite set and a(t) ≡ at ∈ RN
+, we get back to the linear
production games of Owen (1975) and Billera and Raanan (1981), which
include glove market games.
Proposition 1 Generalized linear production games are market games.
In other words, generalized linear production games are a class of market
games. By Marinacci and Montrucchio (2001), their cores are given by
core(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ co(a(t):a(t) • P (Ω)=ν (Ω))}, (6)
a formula that generalizes earlier results for linear games of Billera and
Raanan (1981).
Being market games, generalized linear production games are totally bal-
anced. But, they are not necessarily exact. To establish when they do, for
each E let
T (E)={t ∈ T : a(t) • P (E)=ν (E)};
that is, T (E) ⊆ T is the non-empty compact subset of all the minimizers at
E.B y( 6 ) ,w et h e nh a v e
core(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ co{a(t):t ∈ T (Ω)}}, (7)
and so
νe(E)= m i n
t∈T(Ω)
a(t) • P(E).
This immediately leads to the following condition for exactness, trivially
ful￿lled when T (Ω)=T.
8Proposition 2 A generalized production game is exact if and only if T (E)∩
T (Ω) 6= ∅ for all E ∈ Σ.
We can now state the announced characterization of games in ef (Σ).
Remarkably, it shows that an exact game has a ￿nite-dimensional core in
na(Σ) if and only if it is an exact generalized linear production game. That is,
all exact games with ￿nite dimensional cores are market games of a particular
type.
In reading the next result it is important to observe that a subset Γ of
na(Σ) is ￿nite dimensional if and only if there exists a set {P1,...,PN} ⊆
na+ (Σ) such that Γ ⊆ span{P1,...,PN}.I n f a c t , i f {P1,...,PN} were not
a subset of positive non-atomic charges, we can always replace it with the


























Theorem 2 Let {P1,...,PN} ⊆ na+ (Σ). Given a game ν : Σ → R,c o n s i d e r
the following conditions:
(i) ν is exact and core(ν) ⊆ span{P1,...,PN},
(ii) ν is an exact and generalized linear production game,
(iii) there is a weak∗-compact set Γα ⊆ span{P1,...,PN} such that ν (E)=
minm∈Γα m(E) for all E,
(iv) there is a function g : RN → R concave and homogeneous of degree one
such that ν (E)=g (P (E)) for all E.
Then,
(i) ⇐⇒ (ii) ⇐⇒ (iii)= ⇒ (iv),
with
g (x)= m i n
χ∈R(Γα)
χ • x for all x ∈ R
N,
and
core(ν)=Γα = co(Γα)={χ • P : χ ∈ co(R(Γα))}. (8)
Condition (iv) is not equivalent to the other three conditions, but it is
only implied by them. As a matter of fact, if g is concave and homogeneous
of degree one, the measure game g (P) is totally balanced, but not necessarily
9exact. Next we show what is the exact envelope of g (P) and, therefore, what
other properties are needed on g to make the game g (P) exact and condition
(iv) equivalent to conditions (i)-(iii). Recall that the superdiﬀerential at




N : g(x) ≤ g (x0)+χ • (x − x0) for all x ∈ R
N“
.
In particular, ∂g (x0) 6= ∅ at all x0 ∈ RN provided g is concave (see, e.g.,
Rockafellar, 1970).
Proposition 3 Let g : RN → R be a function concave and homogeneous
of degree one. Then, the measure game ν = g (P) is a totally balanced
generalized linear production game, whose exact envelope is the measure game
νe = ge (P) with
ge (x)= m i n
χ∈∂g(P(Ω))
χ • x for all x ∈ R
N.
In particular, ν = g (P) is exact if and only if ge (x)=g (x) for all x ∈ R(P).
This implies that if g is diﬀerentiable at P (Ω) ￿o re q u i v a l e n t l ya ta n y
point of the diagonal tP (Ω),w i t ht ∈ [0,1] ￿t h e nge(x) is linear and the
game ν is additive.
An important class of generalized production games is given by glove
market games, de￿ned as minima of ￿nitely many non-atomic charges. A




m(E)=m i n{m1 (E),...,m N (E)}
for all E ∈ Σ.1 In view of condition (iii) of Theorem 2, these games can
therefore be considered as generalized production games that are ￿nitely
generated. The next result, based on the properties of the m-closure, shows
that among exact games they are characterized by having cores that are
polytopes, a very special class of ￿nite dimensional sets.2
1Einy et al. (1996) p. 208 observe that for positive glove market games the condition
is necessary as well whenever for each t ∈ T there is E such that T (E)={t}.B yw h a t
we have discussed, this observation applies to all generalized production games. It is also
easy to see that it holds when Γ consists of signed measures (see the proof of Proposition
4).
2A polytope is the convex hull of a ￿nite set. It can shown that polytopes are nothing
but compact polyhedra (see Aliprantis and Border, 1999).
10Proposition 4 An exact game ν : Σ → R is a glove market game if and
only if its core is a polytope in na(Σ).
Example 3 in Appendix A shows that the ￿only if￿ part of this result is no
longer true if in the de￿nition of glove market games we drop the requirement
that Γα is a subset of na(Σ). In contrast, the other part would still hold.
4.1 Some Consequences
The characterization provided by Theorem 2 has some interesting conse-
quences for the class ef (Σ).T h e￿rst one is given by the next Proposition,
which shows that convex games cannot belong to ef (Σ), unless they are ad-
ditive, a trivial case from a game-theoretic standpoint. Conceptually this is
an important property because it shows that the class of games which we are
interested in has only a trivial overlap with the class of convex games.
Proposition 5 A bounded convex game belongs to ef (Σ) if and only if it is
a charge.
By Proposition 1 and Theorem 2, every game in ef (Σ) is a market game.
Hence, it has a positively homogeneous and na-continuous extension ν∗ to
B1 (Σ). The next result provides another characterization of games in ef (Σ)
in terms of its extension ν∗; moreover, it relates ν∗ with the (non-atomic)
concave upper envelope ν : B (Σ) → R of ν given by
ν (f)
=i n f {hm,fi + α : m ∈ na(Σ), α ∈ R and m(E)+α ≥ ν (E) ∀E ∈ Σ}
for all f ∈ B (Σ).
Proposition 6 A game belongs to ef (Σ) if and only if it is a market game
such that its na-extension ν∗ admits a further extension to B (Σ),s t i l ld e -
noted ν∗, having the following properties:
(i) ν∗ is concave and positively homogeneous,
(ii) ν∗ (α1Ω)=αν∗ (1Ω), for all α ∈ R,
(iii) the function ν∗ : B (Σ) → R is na-lower semicontinuous at 0.
11In such a case, we have
ν
∗ (f)=ν (f)= m i n
m∈core(ν)
hm,fi. (9)
for all f ∈ B1 (Σ).
Inspection of the proof of Proposition 6 shows that if we drop assumption
(ii), then conditions (i) and (iii) together characterize those market games
which are generalized linear production games. We thus have the following
characterization of generalized linear production games that are not neces-
sarily exact.3
Proposition 7 A game is a generalized linear production game if and only if
it is a market game such that its na-extension ν∗ admits a further extension
to B (Σ) which is concave, positively homogeneous, and na-lower semicon-
tinuous at 0.
5 Stability
We now present an application of our theory by proving that the cores of
all continuous games in ef (Σ) are their unique von Neumann-Morgenstern
stable sets.
In order to do this, we need some terminology. Let
I (ν)={m ∈ ba(Σ):m(Ω) ≤ ν (Ω)}
be the set of all (sub)imputations. In our non-atomic setting we prefer not to
require any individual rationality condition on the set I (ν) since our results
do not need it and, of course, they would continue to hold under any notion
of individual rationality one would like to impose on I (ν).
A coalition E is null is ν (E ∪ F)=ν (F) for all F such that F ∩E = ∅.
Given ξ,η ∈ I (ν) and A ∈ Σ,w es a yt h a tη dominates ξ via A, written η ￿A
ξ,i fξ (A) < η (A) ≤ ν (A), η (E) ≥ ξ (E) for all E ⊆ A,a n dη(E) > ξ (E)
for all non-null subcoalitions E ⊆ A.
A subset V of I (ν) is a (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable set if it sat-
is￿es the following two conditions:
3We omit the proof since it is similar to that of Proposition 6.
12(i) Internal stability: if ξ ∈ V , there is no A ∈ Σ and η ∈ V such that
η ￿A ξ.
(ii) External stability: if ξ ∈ I (ν)\V ,t h e r ei ss o m eA ∈ Σ and η ∈ V such
that η ￿A ξ.
We can now state our result.
Theorem 3 Let ν be a continuous game in ef (Σ). Then the core of ν is its
unique stable set.
The proof of the result rests on the following lemma of independent in-
terest. Einy et al. (1997) proved a similar lemma when S = Ω for continuous
and positive convex games. Here, using diﬀerent techniques based on Theo-
rem 2, we show that it holds for continuous games in ef (Σ).
Lemma 2 Let ν ∈ ef (Σ) be a continuous game and S a ￿xed coalition in
Σ. For all ξ ∈ ca(Σ),t h e r ee x i s tA ⊆ S and η ∈ core(ν) such that
ν (A) − ξ (A)=m a x
C⊆S
{ν (C) − ξ (C)} (10)
η(A)=ν (A) and η(B) ≥ ξ (B) for all B ⊆ A.
A Appendix: More on Closure under Mi-
norization
In this Appendix we study in more detail closure under minorization. We
begin with few properties, collected in few lemmas for later use in Appendix
B. We will focus on the weak∗-compact case as it is the most important case
for our purposes.
Lemma 3 Suppose Γα is a weak∗-compact set. Then:
(i) Γα is weak∗-compact and convex, and cow∗ (Γα) ⊆ Γα.
(ii) νΓα is the unique exact game such that core(ν)=Γα;i np a r t i c u l a r ,
νΓα (E)=m i n
m∈Γα
m(E) for all E ∈ Σ.
13Lemma 3 has some noteworthy consequences. First, a weak∗-compact set
Γα is the core of a game if and only if it is m-closed. For, cores are clearly
m-closed, while, by point (ii) of Lemma 3, the m-closed sets Γα are cores of
the games νΓα.
Second, by point (ii) there exists a one-to-one correspondence between
exact games and m-closed weak∗-compact sets, given by
Γα 7−→ νΓα,
with Γα = Γα. This correspondence closely parallels the one-to-one relation
existing between closed convex sets and support functions.
The next lemma, based on Schmeidler (1972), shows what happens when
Γα is a subset of ca(Σ).
Lemma 4 Suppose Γα is a weak∗-compact set. Then, Γα ⊆ ca(Σ) if and
only if the lower envelope game νΓα is continuous at ∅ and Ω. In such a
case, we have:
(i) Γα is a weakly compact subset of ca(Σ) and νΓα is continuous.
(ii) Γα ⊆ L1 (Σ,λ) for some λ ∈ ca+ (Σ);i np a r t i c u l a r ,λ ∈ cos (Γα) if
Γα ⊆ ca+ (Σ).
(iii) Γα ⊆ na(Σ) if Γα ⊆ na(Σ).
Remark. By (ii), Γ can be isometrically imbedded into L1 (Σ,λ) by the map
m → dm/dλ, which is its Radon-Nikodym derivative.
The ￿nal lemma deals with the behavior of the m-closure with respect
to the Minkowski diﬀerence of sets. Given two weak∗-compact sets Γα and
Gβ in ba(Σ),t h e i rMinkowski diﬀerence is the (possibly empty) set Γα “Gβ
de￿ned as
Γα “ Gβ = {m ∈ ba(Σ):m + Gβ ⊆ Γα}.
The set Γα “ Gβ is the maximal set ∆α−β such that ∆ + Gβ ⊆ Γα.T h i s
operation is also known as star diﬀerence (see, e.g., Penot, 1985).
Lemma 5 Let Γα and Gβ be weak∗-compact sets of ba(Σ). Then:
(i) Γα “ Gβ is weak∗-compact,
14(ii) if Γα is m-closed, then Γα “ Gβ is m-closed,






= Γα “ Gβ.
Next we report the examples illustrating Theorem 1.
Example 1. Let Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3} and Σ =2 Ω. Consider the compact and




+ (Σ):P (Ω)=1 and P (ω1) ≤ P (ω2)
“
.
It is easy to check that the charge P such that P (ω1)=P (ω3)=1/2 belongs
to Γ1, but it does not belong to co(Γ1). N
Example 2. Let Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3} and Σ =2 Ω.S e t Γ1 = {P,Q},w h e r e
P and Q are the probability charges such that P (ω1)=P (ω2)=1/2 and
Q(ω3)=1, respectively. It is easy to see that:
Γ1 = {(x1,x 2,x 3) ∈ [0,1/2] ￿ [0,1/2] ￿ [0,1]:x1 + x2 + x3 = 1}.
Hence, Γ1 is larger than co{P,Q}.S i n c e t h e g a m e νΓ1 generated by Γ1 is
convex, this example, based on Wasserman and Kadane (1990), shows that
Theorem 1 fails even for sets of measures generating convex games. N
Example 3. Let Ω =[ 0 ,1] and Σ is its Borel σ-algebra. Set Γ1 = {δ0,λ},
where δ0 is the Dirac measure concentrated at 0 and λ is the Lebesgue mea-
sure on [0,1].B y L e m m a 3 , t h e m-closure Γ1 is given by the core of the
continuous and convex game




λ(E) if 0 ∈ E,
0 if 0 / ∈ E
a probability measure P belongs to Γ1 if and only if P (E) ≥ λ(E) for all E







δ0 + fdλ :0≤ f ≤ 1 λ-a.e.
￿
.
Clearly, Γ1 is not ￿nite dimensional and it is therefore much larger than the
￿nite dimensional set co(Γ1). N
15B Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1. We ￿rst show that R is well de￿ned. Let χ,χ0 ∈ RN be such
that χ • m = χ0 • m. Then, (χ − χ0) • m(E)=0for all E ∈ Σ,a n ds o
(χ − χ0) • m ∈ span(R(m))
⊥.H e n c e ,π(χ) − π(χ0)=π (χ − χ0)=0 ,w h i c h
implies π(χ)=π(χ0).I t i s e a s y t o c h e c k t h a t R is a linear isomorphism.
Moreover, span{m1,...,mN} with the relative weak∗-topology is a ￿nite-
dimensional topological vector space. Hence, R is weak∗-continuous.
Theorem 1. Let P =( P1,...,PN):Σ → RN
+ be a non-atomic positive
charge. Assume ￿rst that Γα ⊆ span{P1,P 2,...,PN}.W e c a n w r i t e m =
R(m) • P for each m ∈ Γα. Consider the function g (x)=m i n m∈Γα R(m) • x
for all x ∈ RN and the associated measure game ν = g (P),d e ￿ned by
ν (E)=m i n
m∈Γα
R(m) • P (E)=m i n
m∈Γα
m(E) for all E ∈ Σ.
Clearly, ν is exact and core(ν)=Γα by Lemma 3.
On the other hand, the canonical map R is continuous on the weak∗-
compact set Γα, which is metrizable since it is a ￿nite-dimensional subset
of ba(Ω). Hence, it is a generalized linear production game. Therefore,
according to (6), we have
core(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ co(R(m):R(m) • P (Ω)=ν (Ω)) = α}
= {χ • P : χ ∈ co(R(m):m ∈ Γα)} = co(R(m) • P : m ∈ Γα)
= co(Γα).
We conclude that Γα = co(Γα), as desired.
Next suppose Γα ⊆ span{m1,m 2,....,mN},w h e r em =( m1,...,mN):






















i ∈ na+ (Σ), by what established before we conclude that
Γα = co(Γα)=Γα.
Corollary 1. Suppose ν1 and ν2 be exact. We have
(ν1 + ν2)(A)=ν1 (A)+ν2 (A)= m i n
m1∈core(ν1)






16By (ii) of Lemma 3, we have
core(ν1 + ν2)=core(ν1)+core(ν2).
As to the diﬀerence rule, it follows from point (iii) Lemma 5 by taking
Γ = core(ν1) and G = core(ν2).
As to the second part, it suﬃces to observe that core(ν1)+core(ν2) is a
convex and ￿nitely dimensional subset of na(Σ).B yT h e o r e m1 ,
core(ν1)+core(ν2)=core(ν1)+core(ν2),
as desired
Proposition 1. Let ν : Σ → R be a generalized linear production game.
By de￿nition, there exists a superlinear function g : RN → R, given by (5),
such that ν = g (P).T h i si m p l i e st h a tν is superadditive. Moreover, being
concave, the function g is uniformly continuous on R(P); hence, for all ε > 0
there is δ > 0 such that
kP (E) − P (E
0)k < δ =⇒ |g (P (E)) − g (P (E
0))| = |ν (E) − ν (E
0)| < ε.
The game ν is therefore na-uniformly continuous and so it admits a unique










for all f ∈ B1 (Σ). Hence, ν∗ is positively homogeneous
and so ν is a market game.
Theorem 2. In view of (6), (ii) and (iii) are equivalent. On the other
hand, if we set Γα = core(ν), clearly (i) implies (iii). As to the converse,
ν =m i n m∈Γα m implies ν =m i n m∈Γα m. By Lemma 3, core(ν)=Γα.B y
Proposition 1, core(ν)=co(Γα) and so core(ν) ⊆ span{P1,...,PN}.
To prove that (iii) implies (iv), set g (x)=m i n χ∈R(Γα) χ•x for all x ∈ RN,
where R is given by (1). The function g : RN → R is well de￿ned because
R(Γα) is a compact subset of RN. Clearly, it is also concave and homogeneous
of degree one. Moreover, we have




R(m) • P (E)= m i n
χ∈R(Γα)
χ • P (E)=g (P (E)),
which proves that (iii) implies (iv). As Theorem 1 immediately implies Eq.
(8), the proof of the Theorem is completed.
17Proposition 3. Let ν = g (P),w h e r eg is a ￿nite concave and linearly
homogeneous function on Rn. It is well-known (see Section 13 in [24]) that g
is a support function, i.e., is the Fenchel conjugate of the indicator function
of some compact and convex set C. By using notation from [24], g = δ
∗ (.;C).
Moreover, C = ∂g (0) = {χ : χ • x ≥ g (x) for all x ∈ Rn}. Clearly, from
g (x)=m i n
χ∈C
χ • x,
we infer that ν = g (P) is a generalized linear production game. By (6), the
core of ν = g (P) is
core(ν)={χ • P : χ ∈ C and χ • P (Ω)=g (P (Ω))}
= {χ • P : χ ∈ ∂g}.
In view of the de￿nition of the concave function ge,w eh a v e
ge(P (A)) = min
χ∈∂g(P(Ω))
χ • P (A)= m i n
m∈core(ν)
m(A).
Hence, ge(P) is the exact envelope of g (P). All the other claims are obvious.
Proposition 4. Let ν be an exact game whose core is a polytope. There
exists a ￿nite subset Γ = {m1,...,mn} ⊆ core(ν) consisting of the extremal
points of core(ν) and co(Γ)=core(ν) (see Lemma 5.123 of [1]). By Lemma
3, Γ ⊆ co(Γ) ⊆ Γ implies Γ ⊆ co(Γ) ⊆ Γ,n a m e l y ,Γ = core(ν). Therefore,
min
m∈Γ
m(E)= m i n
m∈core(ν)
m(E)=ν (E),
and so ν is a glove market game.
Conversely, suppose that ν is an exact glove market game relative to a
set {m1,...,mn} ⊆ na(Σ).T h e r e e x i s t s m ∈ na(Σ) such that mi ≥ m for
each i = 1,...,n.T h e g a m e ν − m is a positive exact market game. By
what proved on p. 208 of [11] for positive exact glove market game, it holds
(mi − m)(Ω)=( ν − m)(Ω) for each i = 1,...,n. Hence, for α = ν (Ω),w e
have {m1,...,mn} ⊆ Γα.B yL e m m a3 ,core(ν)=Γα and so, by Theorem 1,
core(ν)=co(Γα). Hence, core(ν) is a polytope.
Proposition 5. Let ν be a bounded convex game in ef (Σ).B yT h e o r e m
2, there is {P1,...,PN} ⊆ na+ (Σ) and g : RN → R such that ν = g (P) is a
18generalized production game. Let E ∈ Σ be such that P (E) ≥ (1/2)P (Ω).
We want to show that E is linear, i.e., ν (E)+ν (Ec)=ν (Ω).A sP (E) ≥
(1/2)P (Ω) ≥ P (Ec), by the Lyapunov Theorem there exists F ⊆ E such
that P (F)=P (Ec).S i n c e ν is convex, there is m ∈ core(ν) such that
m(E)=ν (E) and m(F)=ν (F).A score(ν) ⊆ span(P1,...,PN),f o rs o m e
χ ∈ RN we have ν (E)=χ • P (E) and ν (F)=χ • P (F). Therefore,
ν (E)+ν (E
c)=ν (E)+ν (F)=χ • (P (E)+P (F)) = χ • P (Ω)=ν (Ω),
and so E is a linear coalition. This implies that m(E)=ν (E) for all
m ∈ core(ν). The same argument shows that if P (E) ≤ (1/2)P (Ω),t h e n
E is linear.
Now let A be such that P (A)=( 1/2)P (Ω).C l e a r l y ,A is linear. Given
any E ∈ Σ,w eh a v eP (E ∪ A) ≥ (1/2)P (Ω) ≥ P (E ∩ A).B y w h a t h a s
been just proved, both E ∪ A and E ∩ A are linear. Hence, for all m,m0 ∈
core(ν) we have
m(E)=m(E ∪ A)+m(E ∩ A) − m(A)
= m
0 (E ∪ A)+m
0 (E ∩ A) − m
0 (A)=m
0 (E).
As this holds for all E ∈ Σ, core(ν) is a singleton, say core(ν)={m}.A sν
exact, we then have ν = m, as desired.
Proposition 6. ￿Only if part￿. Assume ν ∈ ef (Σ). By Theorem 2,
there exists a positively homogeneous concave function g : RN → R such
that ν = g (P). The same argument, adopted in Proposition 1, shows that ν


















hf,χ • Pi =m i n
m∈core(ν)
hf,mi.
It remains to check that ν = ν∗ on B1 (Σ).L e t u s￿rst prove that ν ≥ ν∗.
Suppose per contra that ν (f) < ν∗ (f) for some f ∈ B1 (Σ). Then there exists
m ∈ na(Σ) and α ∈ R such that hm,fi+α < ν∗ (f) and m(E)+α ≥ ν (E)
for all E ∈ Σ. Since both m and ν∗ are na-continuous, there exists an na-
neighborhood Uf of f such that hm,ϕi + α < ν∗ (ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ Uf.B y
19the na-density of the characteristic functions, there is some E such that
m(E)+α < ν (E), a contradiction.
As to the opposite inequality, let f ∈ B1 (Σ).A sν∗ (f)=m i n m∈core(ν) hf,mi,
there is m ∈ core(ν) such that ν∗ (f)=hm,fi.C o n s e q u e n t l y , ν (f) ≤
hm,fi = ν∗ (f), as desired.
Clearly, ν∗ admits an extension to B (Σ), given by the support function
νe =m i n m∈core(ν) hm,fi which satis￿es trivially conditions (i) and (ii). To





.B u tg is uniformly continuous over RN (actually
it is globally Lipschitz on RN). Clearly, this implies that νe is na-continuous.
￿If part￿. Assume that ν is an exact market game. Denote by ν∗ its
extension to B (Σ), as claimed by the Proposition. As the na-topology
in B (Σ) is weaker than the σ (B (Σ),ba(Σ))-topology, ν∗ turns out to be
σ(B (Σ),ba(Σ))-lower semicontinuous at 0. By the well-known global prop-
erty of concave functions, ν∗ is σ(B (Σ),ba(Σ))-continuous on B (Σ) (see,
for instance, Thm. 5.27 of [1]). By Hormander￿s theorem [16], ν∗ is a support
function and there exists a unique weak∗-compact and convex set Γ ⊂ ba(Σ)
such that
ν
∗ (f)=m i n
m∈Γ
hm,fi. (12)
and Γ is of ￿nite dimension (see Th. 6 of [16]). We want to prove that
actually Γ ⊂ na(Σ). To this purpose we follow the argument of [16] p. 184.
Since the sets
{f ∈ B (Σ):|hmi,fi| < ε}
with {mi}
n
i=1 ⊆ na1 (Σ) form an na-neighborhood base at 0,a l s ot h es e t s
{f ∈ B (Σ):|hmi,fi| < 1},w i t h{mi}
n
i=1 ⊆ na(Σ) form an na-neighborhood
base at 0.C o n s i d e rt h ena-neighborhood
V (m1,...,mn)={f ∈ B (Σ):|hmi,fi| < 1}
of 0.L e tK b et h ec o n v e xh u l lo ft h e2n charges –mi.S e t
hK (f)=m i n
m∈K
hm,fi
for all f ∈ B (Σ).I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a thK (f)=m i n i=1,...,n(−|hmi,fi|)=
−maxi=1,...,n |hmi,fi|. Hence, V (m1,...,mn)={f ∈ B (Σ):hK (f) > −1}.
By the na-lower continuity of ν∗ at 0,t h e r ee x i s t sa nna-neighborhood
V (m1,...,m n)={f ∈ B (Σ):hK (f) > −1} of 0 such that
hK (f) > −1 =⇒ ν
∗ (f) > −1. (13)
20I nt u r n ,t h i si m p l i e st h a tν∗ (f) ≥ hK (f) for all f ∈ B (Σ). For, suppose
there exists f ∈ B (Σ) such that ν∗ (f) <h K (f), i.e., −ν∗ (f) > −hK (f) ≥
0. Then, there would exist a positive scalar α such that −αν∗ (f) > 1 >
−αhK (f). As both the functions ν∗ and hK are positively homogeneous, we
infer that ν∗ (αf) < −1 and hK (αf) > −1, contradicting (13).
We conclude that ν∗ (f) ≥ hK (f) for all f ∈ B (Σ).H e n c e ,Γ ⊆ K,a n d
so it is a ￿nite dimensional subset of na(Σ).
Setting f = 1Ω and f = −1Ω in Eq. (12), and exploiting condition (ii)
we get easily that m(Ω)=ν (Ω) for all m ∈ Γ. To complete the proof, by
(12) for all E ∈ Σ we have
ν (E)=m i n
m∈Γ
m(E)
Hence, the game is exact. Moreover, as Γ is a ￿nite dimensional subset of
na(Σ), Theorem 1 implies that core(ν)=co(Γ)=Γ.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,ν is an
exact game in ef (Σ).
Lemma 2. A c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a4 ,a sν is continuous, core(ν) ⊆ span{P1,...,P N}
with each Pi ∈ na+
σ (Σ). By Theorem 2, there is a concave and positively
homogeneous g : RN → R such that ν = g (P).S e tP∗ =
Pn
i=1 Pi. Clearly,
core(ν) ⊆ L1 (P∗).
To prove this Lemma, we need some notation. Throughout the proof we
￿x a coalition S.W ed e n o t eb yνS t h es u b g a m eo fν on ΣS, the restriction of
Σ to S. For any m ∈ ba(Σ), mS ∈ ba(ΣS) is its restriction to S.M o r e o v e r ,
L : B (ΣS) → B (Σ) is the natural extension de￿ned by
L(ϕ)(ω)=
‰
ϕ(ω) if ω ∈ S
0 if ω / ∈ S
Its adjoint operator L∗ : ba(Σ) → ba(ΣS) is de￿ned by L∗ (m)=mS for
each m ∈ ba(Σ).I f ν∗ is the na-continuous extension of ν, ν∗
S denotes its
restriction to B1 (ΣS), i.e., ν∗
S = ν∗ ◦ L. Finally, νe : B (Σ) → R denotes the
support function νe (f)=m i n m∈core(ν) hm,fi.








=( νe ◦ L)(ϕ) (14)







21Finally, let U = {ϕ ∈ L∞(P∗
S):0≤ ϕ ≤ 1 P∗
S − a.e.}. Clearly, ν∗
S is well





for all ϕ ∈ U.
We begin the proof by assuming that ξ ∈ L1 (P∗). Consider the function
ν∗
S − ξS : U → R.I fP ∗ (S)=0 , this function is equal to zero on U and so
it trivially achieves its maximum. Assume that P∗ (S) > 0. The function
ξS : U → R is σ(L∞,L 1)-continuous because ξS ∈ L1 (P∗
S). The same is true
for ν∗


























As g is continuous and each dPi/dP∗ belongs to L1 (P ∗), the function ν∗
S :
U → R is σ (L∞,L 1)-continuous. Therefore, ν∗
S − ξS : U → R achieves its
maximum on U by the Alaoglu Theorem. This maximum is attained at some
1A.I nf a c t ,l e tϕ ∈ argmaxϕ∈U ν∗




S.A sξ ∈ L1 (P ∗) is a non-atomic signed measure, by
the Lyapunov Theorem there exists some A ⊆ S such that Pi (A)=
R
S ϕdPi








−.T h u s ,ν∗
S (ϕ)−hξS,ϕi =
ν∗




S (ϕ) ≤ ν (A)+hξS,ϕi − ξS (A)
for all ϕ ∈ U. In particular, this is the case for all ϕ ∈ B1 (ΣS) and so
ξS ∈ ∂ν∗
S (1A),w h e r e∂ν∗
S (1A) denotes the superdiﬀerential of the concave
function ν∗
S de￿ned on B1 (ΣS).N o w ,ν∗
S c a nb ev i e w e da st h es u mo ft w o
functions de￿ned over B (ΣS).A c t u a l l y ,b y( 1 4 )w eh a v eν∗




0 if ϕ ∈ B1 (ΣS)
−∞ if ϕ / ∈ B1 (ΣS)




S (1A)=∂ (νe ◦ L)(1A)+∂I (1A).
It holds ∂I (1A)=KS
A,w h e r e
K
S
A = {m ∈ ba(ΣS):m(F) ≥ 0, m(G) ≤ 0 for all F ⊆ A
c and G ⊆ A}.
Moreover, νe being continuous, we have
∂ (νe ◦ L)(1A)=L
∗∂ (νe)(L1A)=L
∗∂ (νe)(1A)
22(see, e.g., Thm. 1.5 of [23]). Since,
∂ (νe)(1A)={m ∈ core(ν):m(A)=ν (A)}







Hence, ξS = ηS + m,w i t hη ∈ core(ν), η(A)=ν (A),a n dm(G) ≤ 0 for all
G ⊆ A.T h i sp r o v e sL e m m a2a sl o n ga sξ ∈ L1 (P∗).






for all A1 =( A \ N1) ∪ N2 ⊆ S with P∗ (N1)=P ∗ (N2)=0 . For, we have
∂νe (1A)=∂νe (1A1), while the two cones KS
A and KS










Now, let ξ ∈ ca(Σ). By the Lebesgue Decomposition Theorem, we have
ξ = ξ
a+ξ
s,w h e r eξ
a ∈ L1 (P∗) and ξ
s ⊥ P ∗. Hence, there exists N ∈ Σ such
that P∗ (N)=0and |ξ
s|(Ω \ N)=0 . By the Hahn-Jordan Decomposition
Theorem, there is a decomposition N = N+ ∪N− such that ξ
s is positive on




























which proves our claim for any ξ ∈ ca(Σ).
Theorem 3. Having established Lemma 2, the proof of Theorem 3 is simple;
the ￿rst part is similar to the argument used on p. 10 by [12].
As well-known, if V is any stable set of ν,t h e ncore(ν) ⊆ V .I tt h e r e f o r e
suﬃces to prove that any element ξ ∈ I (ν)\core(ν) is dominated by some
element in the core.
23Suppose ￿rst that ξ ∈ ca(Σ).A sξ ∈ I (ν)\core(ν),t h e r ei ss o m eU ∈ Σ
such that ξ (U) < ν (U).L e tε > 0 be such that (ξ + εP∗)(U) < ν (U).U s e
Lemma 2 with S = Ω and with ξ + εP∗ in place of ξ. Then, there exists
A ∈ Σ and η ∈ core(ν) such that η(A)=ν (A) and η(B) ≥ ξ (B)+εP ∗ (B)
for all B ⊆ A. Moreover, it holds ν (A) > ξ (A)+εP∗ (A) because A ∈
argmaxΣ ν − (ξ + εP ∗) and ν (U) − (ξ + εP ∗)(U) > 0. Clearly, this implies
η(A) > ξ (A).
By Theorem 2, ν (B)=m i n χ∈R(Γα) χ • P (B). Hence, if P∗ (B)=0 ,t h e
coalition B is null, and so we have P∗ (B) > 0 for all non-null subcoalition
B.T h u s ,η(B) > ξ (B) for all non-null B.W ec o n c l u d et h a tη ￿A ξ.
Next assume ξ ∈ ba(Σ). The imputation ξ can be uniquely decomposed
into a sum ξ
c + ξ
p,w h e r eξ
c ∈ ca(Σ) and ξ
p is purely additive. Therefore,
there exists an increasing sequence Cn ∈ Σ such that |ξ
p|(Cn)=0for all n,
and P∗ (Ω \ Cn) → 0 as n →∞(see [27]). As before, let U ∈ Σ be such
that ξ (U) < ν (U). Consider the coalitions U ∩ Cn.S i n c e ν is continuous,
there is some n such that ξ (S) < ν (S),w i t hS = U ∩ Cn.F o rs o m eε > 0,
we have ξ (S)+εP ∗ (S) < ν (S) for some ε > 0. We now apply Lemma 2
where S i st h es a m eo ft h eL e m m aa n dξ is replaced by ξ
c + εP ∗.N o t e
that, by construction, ξ (S)=ξ
c (S).T h e r ee x i s t sA ⊆ S and η ∈ core(ν)
such that η(A)=ν (A) > ξ
c (A)+εP ∗ (A)=ξ (A)+εP∗ (A),a n dη (B) ≥
ξ (B)+εP∗ (B) for all B ⊆ A. T h es a m ea r g u m e n tu s e db e f o r ei m p l i e st h a t
η ￿A ξ and the proof is completed.
Lemma 3. (i) Let m1,m 2 ∈ Γα and E ∈ Σ. There exist m0
1,m 0
2 ∈ Γα such
that m1 (E) ≥ m0
1 (E) and m2 (E) ≥ m0
2 (E). Hence, for every t ∈ (0,1),
tm1 (E)+(1 − t)m2 (E) ≥ tm
0
1 (E)+(1 − t)m
0





The set Γα is therefore convex. It is also immediate to check that Γα is closed.
To show that it is weak∗-compact, by the Alaoglu Theorem it is enough to
prove that Γα is norm bounded. Given E ∈ Σ,f o re a c hm ∈ Γα there are
m0,m 00 ∈ Γα such that m0 (E) ≤ m(E) ≤ m00 (E) (consider E and Ec).
Hence, supm∈Γα |m(E)| =s u p m∈Γα |m(E)| < ∞ and Γα is set-wise bounded.
By the Uniform Boundedness Principle, Γα is then norm bounded.
As to (ii), it is a straightforward consequence of (i). It remains to prove
(iii). Set ν =m i n m∈Γα m, which is well de￿ned because Γα is weak∗-compact.
To prove (iii) it is enough to show that Γα = core(ν). Clearly, Γα ⊆ core(ν).
As to the converse, let m ∈ core(ν). By the de￿nition of ν,f o re a c hE
24there is m0 ∈ Γα such that m0 (E) ≤ m(E). On the other hand, by the
de￿nition of m-closure, there is m00 ∈ Γα such that m0 (E) ≥ m00(E).H e n c e ,
m(E) ≥ m00 (E),a n ds om ∈ Γα.W e c o n c l u d e t h a t Γα = core(ν),a s
desired.
Lemma 4. This proof is a variation on known arguments and we report it
for the sake of completeness. Suppose ￿rst that νΓ is continuous at ∅ and
at Ω.I fw eh a v eAn ↓ ∅ and if m ∈ core(νΓ), we deduce that
νΓ (An) ≤ m(An) ≤ ν (Ω) − νΓ (Ω \ An).
Hence, m(An) → 0 provided νΓ is continuous at ∅ and Ω,a n ds oΓ ⊆
core(νΓ) ⊆ ca(Σ). Conversely, suppose Γ ⊆ ca(Σ).S i n c e Γ is weak∗-
compact, it is a weakly compact subset of ca(Σ) (see, e.g., [29]). It is then
easy to see that νΓ is continuous at ∅ and Ω.
(i) Let us show that Γ ⊆ ca(Σ).A s s u m e An ↓ ∅.L e t u s s h o w t h a t
m(An) → 0 for all m ∈ Γ. By using the complementation, we have
m
0
n (An) ≥ m(An) ≥ m
00
n(An)
for all m ∈ Γ,w h e r em0
n and m00
n are elements in Γ.A sΓ is weakly compact,
the measures in Γ are uniformly additive (see [9], Th. 4.9.1). Hence, for all
ε > 0,w eh a v e|m0
n (Am)| ≤ ε for m ≥ m(ε) and for all n.I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
|m0
m (Am)| ≤ ε.W ec o n c l u d et h a tm0
n (An) → 0. The same argument leads
to m00
n (An) → 0,w h i c h ,i nt u r n ,l e a d st om(An) → 0. Hence, we have
m(An) → 0 for any sequence An ↓ ∅,w h i c hm e a n st h a tm ∈ ca(Σ).H e n c e ,
Γ ⊆ ca(Σ).
Next we prove that νΓ is continuous. Assume, by contradiction, that this
is not the case. Then, there exists some A ∈ Σ and a sequence, say An ↑ A,
and some η > 0 such that |ν (An) − ν (A)| ≥ η.A s ν is exact, we have
ν (An)=mn(An) with mn ∈ Γ.S i n c eΓ is sequentially weakly compact, we
can select a subsequence (renamed mn)s u c ht h a tmn → m∗ ∈ Γ.W e c a n
then write
ν (An)=mn (An)=mn (A) − mn (A \ An)
As n →∞ ,w eg e tlimn→∞ν (An)=m∗ (A) ≥ ν (A),s i n c emn (A \ An) → 0,
thanks to the uniform additivity. On the other hand, there exists an m ∈ Γ,
such that m(A)=ν (A). Hence, from m(An) ≥ ν (An),a sn →∞ ,i t
follows m(A)=ν (A) ≥ limn→∞ν (An) ≥ ν (A).W eo b t a i nlimn→∞ν (An)=
25ν (A). Therefore, the original sequence ν (An) has ν (A) as a limit point,
contradicting |ν (An) − ν (A)| ≥ η.
(ii) Since Γ is weakly compact, the existence of a positive measure λ
such that m ¿ λ for all m ∈ Γα is guaranteed by Theorem IV.9.2 of [9].
As observed by [8], it is useful to modify slightly the construction in that


























Clearly, we have m ¿ λ for all m ∈ Γ. Actually, we have m0 (A) ≥ m(A) ≥
m00 (A) for all A and for some m0,m 00 ∈ Γ.I fλ(A)=0 , this implies m0 (A)=
m00 (A)=0 . It follows that m(A)=0 , that means m ¿ λ.
If Γ ⊆ ca+(Σ),i n( 1 6 )w eh a v e|￿n
i | = ￿n






with λn ∈ co(Γ).W e i n f e r t h a t λ lies in the strong (and weak) closure of
co(Γ).
(iii) Assume Γ ⊆ na(Σ) ∩ ca(Σ). Obviously, the constructed positive
measure λ of Eq. (16) is non-atomic. We must prove that any m ∈ Γ ⊆ L1 (λ)
is non-atomic. Suppose, on the contrary, that A is an atom of m.H e n c e ,
|m|(A)=ε > 0.A s |m| is absolutely continuous w.r.t. λ,t h e r ei ss o m e
δ > 0 such that λ(S) < δ =⇒ |m|(S) < ε/2. On the other hand, as λ is
non-atomic, we can ￿nd a subcoalition A1 ⊆ A,f o rw h i c hλ(A1) < δ.H e n c e ,
|m|(A1) < ε/2 which is a contradiction.
Lemma 5. (i) Observe that ∆ = Γ “ G amounts to ∆ = ∩g∈G (Γ − g).
Hence, ∆ turns out to be the intersection of a family of the weak∗-compact
sets Γ − g.( i i ) L e t ∆ = Γ “ G.B y d e ￿nition, we have G + ∆ ⊆ Γ.I t
is immediately checked that G + ∆ ⊆ Γ,p r o v i d e dΓ is m-closed. By the
maximality of the set ∆,w ei n f e r∆ = ∆. (iii) Suppose Γ “ G 6= ∅ and
26denote ∆ = Γ “ G. This implies G + ∆ ⊆ Γ.H e n c e ,νG + ν∆ ≥ νΓ = νΓ.
We deduce that
νΓ“G ≥ νΓ − νG. (17)
Since νΓ“G is exact, the core of νΓ − νG is non-empty. Conversely, suppose
core(νΓ − νG) 6= ∅.L e t ￿ be any exact game such that ￿ ≥ νΓ − νG
and ￿(Ω)=νΓ(Ω) − νG (Ω). Clearly, some ￿ exists, for example the exact
envelope (νΓ − νG)e is of this kind. Now, ￿xs o m eA ∈ Σ and take two any
elements m ∈ core(￿) and g ∈ G. The inequality ￿ ≥ νΓ − νG implies
that m(A)+g (A) ≥ νΓ (A).C o n s e q u e n t l y , w e h a v e m + g ∈ Γ. Namely,
core(￿)+G ⊆ Γ, that, in turn, implies core(￿) ⊆ Γ“G.A s￿rst consequence,
Γ “ G 6= ∅ and this proves the converse implication. Moreover, we have
obtained that ￿ ≥ νΓ“G.I n v i e w o f ( 1 7 ) , νΓ“G is the minimal exact game
greater than νΓ −νG. Therefore, νΓ“G =( νΓ − νG)e. On the other hand, we
have




= core(νΓ − νG)e = core(νΓ − νG)
where the ￿rst equality comes from (i).
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